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ANTITRUST LAW 
ANTITRUST LAW AND THE SPORTS 
LEAGUE RELOCATION RULES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1982, the United States District Court for the Central 
District of California held that the National Football League 
(NFL) had violated the federal antitrust laws by attempting to 
prevent the Oakland Raiders from moving to Los Angeles. l The 
Ninth Circuit approved this result.2 Yet when the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of California held that 
the National Basketball Association (NBA) had similarly vio-
lated the same antitrust laws by attempting to prevent the San 
Diego Clippers from moving to Los Angeles,3 the Ninth Circuit 
reversed and remanded the decision:' How can these seemingly 
inconsistent results be reconciled? 
This article will focus on the Ninth Circuit's analysis of fed-
eral antitrust law as applied to sports league relocation rules. 
Primary attention will be directed to the court's most recent 
opinion in this area, NBA v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc." In this 
case, the Ninth Circuit held that sports league created restric-
tions on franchise movement do not constitute per se violations 
of antitrust law.6 Therefore, the court reasoned, such restrictions 
1. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 
1381, 1386 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 990 (1984) [hereinafter Raiders 1]. 
2. ld. at 570. 
3. National Basketball Association v. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d 562, 565 (9th 
Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Clippers] (SDC Basketball Club is an abbreviation for San Diego 
Clippers Basketball Club.) 
4. ld. at 570. 
5. 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987) (per Ferguson, J.; the other panel members were 
Nelson, J., and Beezer, J.). 
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must be evaluated under the rule of reason antitrust analysis.? 
II. FACTS 
In the early 1980's, the San Diego Clippers operated as a 
professional basketball team in San Diego.8 The franchise is a 
member of the National Basketball Association (NBA), an or-
ganization of professional basketball teams that operates as a 
joint venture under New York law.9 When the team considered a 
move to Los Angeles, the NBA brought suit in the Southern Dis-
trict of California to prevent an unauthorized move by one of its 
franchises.1o This dispute was resolved when the parties stipu-
lated that the Clippers would stay in San Diego, and that any 
further disputes would be litigated in the Southern District of 
California. 11 
In 1984, the Ninth Circuit held that the National Football 
League (NFL) had violated antitrust laws when it attempted to 
prevent the Oakland Raiders from moving to Los Angeles.12 See-
ing this as a window of opportunity, the Clippers informed the 
7. Id. at 567. 




12. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 
1381 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984) [hereinafter Raiders 11; see also 
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 791 F.2d 1356 
(9th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Raiders II]. 
In Raiders I, the court considered the antitrust implications of the Raiders move 
from Oakland to Los Angeles. Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 138l. The Raiders, without permis-
sion from the National Football League, relocated to the Los Angeles Memorial Coli-
seum. Id. at 1385. The NFL filed a contract suit against the Raiders in state court and 
obtained an injunction preventing the move. Id. The Raiders, joining the Los Angeles 
Memorial Coliseum, cross-claimed against the NFL asserting that the NFL's rule requir-
ing approval by three-quarters of the NFL teams for franchise moves violated the anti-
trust laws. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict which had found that the NFL's 
three-quarter rule constituted an antitrust violation. Id. at 140l. 
In Raiders II, the court considered the damages incurred by the Raiders as a result 
of the NFL's violation of the antitrust laws. Raiders II, 791 F.2d at 1356. The court 
determined that the treble damages awarded to the Raiders as a result of the two year 
delay in moving to Los Angeles must be offset by the NFL's loss of franchise opportunity 
in the Los Angeles area. Id. at 1366. More pointedly, the court held that the antitrust 
award must be reduced by an amount equivilent to the difference in value of locating a 
new NFL team in Oakland, as opposed to Los Angeles. Id. 
2
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NBA of its intention to move to Los Angeles.13 The Clippers as-
serted that any attempt by the NBA to prevent the move would 
violate the antitrust laws.14 To avoid potential liability, the NBA 
scheduled the Clippers games in Los Angeles. lli 
With the Clippers already in Los Angeles, the NBA 
amended its constitution by adopting Article 9A, a new rule gov-
erning franchise moves.16 Article 9A requires that a simple ma-
jority of the member teams approve all team moves.17 Subse-
quent to adopting Article 9A, the NBA sought declaratory relief 
in the Southern District of California. IS The league asserted that 
it was not a violation of the antitrust laws for the NBA to evalu-
ate and assess limits on franchise movement, and that the league 
could assess charges against the Clippers for its unauthorized re-
location.19 The Clippers argued that its move to Los Angeles 
complied with Article 9 of the NBA Constitution, and that Arti-
cle 9A was not adopted until after the Clippers had moved.20 
Under Article 9, whenever a franchise moves into a territory oc-
cupied by another team, the moving franchise must receive per-
mission from the team already in the territory.21 The Los Ange-
les Lakers granted the Clippers permission to move into the Los 
Angeles area.22 Though the NBA acknowledged that the Clip-
pers satisfied the dictates of Article 9, the league asserted that 
this article was not the only stricture on franchise movement.23 




17. Brief for Appellee at 35, National Basketball Association v. SDC Basketball 
Club, 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1986)(No. 86-5891). 
18. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 564. The NBA argued that Article 9A was a new constitu-
tional provision codifying previous practice. Id. This practice was evidenced by a 37 year 
history in which every team move was preceded by approval of the NBA Board of Gover-
nors. Brief for Appellant at 24, National Basketball Ass'n v. SDC Basketball Club, 815 
F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1986)(No. 86-5891). The Clippers argued that Article 9A was rather an 
amendment to Article 9 that, by virtue of the NBA Constitution, required unanimous 
approval by the member teams. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 564. The Clippers thus argued that 
Article 9A was not properly adopted at the time of the Clippers' move, when the Clip-
pers voted against it. Id. 
19. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 564-65. 
20. Id. at 564. Article 9 provided that no team could move into a territory in which 
another team operated without that team's approval. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. The Clippers complied with the NBA Constitution in that the Los Angeles 
Lakers agreed in writing to waive their rights under Article 9. Id. The NBA argued, 
3
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Rather, the league as a body must be permitted to consider 
franchise moves.24 The Clippers argued that such consideration 
by the NBA would violate the antitrust laws.215 
Finding no genuine issues of material fact, the district court 
concluded as a matter of law that the NBA had violated the an-
titrust laws, and therefore granted summary judgment for the 
Clippers.26 From this judgment, the NBA appealed to the Ninth 
Circuit.27 
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The basic requirements for jurisdiction under the Federal 
Declaratory Judgment Act are an actual controversy and a dis-
pute within the federal court's subject matter jurisdiction. 
The United States Constitution and the Federal Declara-
tory Judgment Act require an actual controversy as a prerequi-
site to federal jurisdiction.28 The Supreme Court has held that 
however, that the league must be permitted to consider team moves. [d. Article 9, it 
contended, limited the actions of the NBA, but did not prescribe the only limits on team 
moves. [d. 
24. [d. 
25. [d. at 565. 
26. [d. 
27. [d. 
28. Article III, section 2, clause 1 of the United States Constitution states: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Eq-
uity, arising under this Constution, the Laws of the United 
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and 
maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United 
States shall be a party;-to Controversies between two or more 
States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-Be-
tween Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the 
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, 
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign 
States, Citizens or Subjects. 
The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1983), provides: 
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except 
with respect to Federal taxes other than actions brought under 
section 7428 of Internal Reveune Code of 1954, any court of 
the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, 
may declare the rights and other legal relations of any inter-
ested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further 
relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have 
4
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the controversy must be one that is appropriate for judicial de-
termination.29 Thus, the dispute must be definite and concrete, 
not abstract or hypothetical.30 The Court has conceded that it 
would be difficult to fashion a test that would, in every case, 
de~ermine the existence of an actual controversy.31 
In declaratory relief actions, the Supreme Court has re-
quired a substantial controversy between parties with adverse 
legal interests of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the 
issuance of a declaratory judgment.32 The Court has observed, 
however, that the difference between an abstract question and 
an actual controversy, under the Declaratory Judgment Act, is 
necessarily one of degree.33 Thus, though both the U.S. Consti-
tution and the Declaratory Judgment Act require an actual con-
troversy before a federal court can exercise jurisdiction, the 
the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be 
reviewable as such. 
The Constitution requires "case or controversy;" the Declaratory Judgment Act re-
quires an "actual controversy." For additional discussion of these concepts, see Annota-
tion, Case, Controversy, or Actual Controversy, 40 L.Ed. 2d 783 (Law. Coop. 1975). 
29. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-42, reh. den. 300 U.S. 687 
(1937). Moreover, the Court regards actual controversy under the Declaratory Judgment 
Act to mean the same as case or controversy under the constitution. [d. at 239. In Aetna, 
plaintiff insurance company issued defendant's spouse five insurance policies. [d. at 237. 
Plaintiff sought a declartory judgment stating that it was not obligated to pay under the 
policies because there had been a lapse in the premiums paid. [d. at 239. The lower court 
held that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter because there was no controversy be-
tween the parties. [d. at 236. The appeals court affirmed. [d. The Supreme Court re-
versed, finding that the complaint did in fact present an actual controversy. [d. at 244. 
30. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal and Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941). The 
difference between an abstract question and a controversy contemplated by the Declara-
tory Judgment Act is necessarily one of degree, and it would be difficult, if possible, to 
fashion a precise test for determining in every case whether there is such a controversy. 
[d. 
31. [d. 
32. [d. Basically, the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the 
circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having ad-
verse legal interests, of sufficient inlmediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a 
declaratory judgment. [d. Petitioner Maryland Casualty issued an insurance policy to 
Pacific Coal and Oil Co., which purported to indemnify the insured in the event of an 
accident involving one of the company's trucks. [d. at 271. The Court held that a sub-
stantial controversy existed between the parties when they disputed the extent of cover-
age under the policy. [d. at 273. See also, Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 
F.2d 887, 893 (9th Cir. 1986). In Wickland, a property owner sought declaratory relief 
against the previous owner. [d. The plaintiff asked the court to declare that the defend-
ant was responsible for the hazardous waste materials present on the property. [d. at 
889. Finding that the suit presented an actual controversy, the Ninth Circuit reversed 
the district court's dismissal of the claim, and remanded the case for trial. [d. at 893. 
33. Maryland Casualty, 312 U.S. 270, 273. 
5
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Court has acknowledged that it is not always clear when an ac-
tual controversy will be present.34 
In addition to an actual controversy, the court must have 
subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.3!> The United States 
Constitution confers jurisdiction to the federal courts for all 
matters arising under the constitution or laws of the federal gov-
ernment.36 To determine if the controversy presents a federal 
question, the U.S. Supreme Court has long adhered to the well-
pleaded complaint rule.37 The Court has held that this rule bars 
a plaintiff from invoking federal question jurisdiction by antici-
pating in the complaint a defense the defendant may assert.38 
34.Id. 
35. Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1983). The Act requires an 
actual controversy within the court's jurisdiction. Id. One commentator has observed: 
When deciding where to file suit one of the first questions that 
must be answered is whether the court chosen has the power 
or competence to decide the kind of controversy that is in-
volved. This requirement typically is stated in terms of 
whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the dis-
pute and should be distinguished from questions of personal 
jurisdiction, which focus on the court's authority to enter a 
judgment binding on the particular defendants involved. 
J. F'RIEDENTHAL, M KANE, AND A MILLER, CML PROCEDURE, § 2.1 (1985). 
This discussion of subject matter jurisdiction shall be limited to federal question 
jurisdiciton. Diversity jurisdiction is not appropriate here because there are five NBA 
teams in California, including the Clippers. Thus, diversity is not complete as required 
by Chief Justice Marshall in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806). 
36. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This section states that the federal courts shall 
have jurisdiction over "Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the 
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their au-
thority." Id. See supra note 28. 
37. Gold-Washing and Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199 (1877). Keyes, a landowner 
in Northern California, filed suit in state court to restrain the defendants from con-
ducting their hydraulic mining operation. Id. Hydraulic mining is a process by which 
water is sprayed, under high pressure, at a hillside to uncover the gold contained therein. 
Id. at 199-200. This causes the rivers below to become muddy. Id. at 200. Defendant 
sought removal to federal court, but was denied because the complaint did not present a 
federal question. Id. at 204. 
38. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottely, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). This case 
represents the classic illustration of the well-pleaded complaint rule. As settlement for 
injuries caused by the railroad, the Mottleys accepted free lifetime passes on the train. 
Id. at 250. This agreement was honored for 29 years, until 1907, when a federal statute 
was enacted prohibiting the issuance of free passes. Id. at 150-51. The Mottleys sued the 
railroad in federal court, seeking specific performance. Id. The lower court found for the 
Mottleys, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Mottleys' complaint failed 
to raise a federal question. Id. at 154. The Court stated that it is not enough to antici-
pate a defense for a federally based claim. Id. at 153. For subject matter jurisdiction, the 
federal question must be raised in the complaint as a part of the plaintiff's case. Id. See 
6
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The Supreme Court has held that the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule applies to declaratory relief actions as well.39 Applica-
tion of the rule in the context of an action for declaratory relief, 
however, is far more difficult.40 The problem stems from the 
rigid rule that the federal question must appear on the face of 
the well-pleaded complaint.41 In Skelly Oil v. Phillips Petro-
leum CO.,42 the Court concluded that declaratory judgment ac-
tions should be heard by federal courts only if the coercive ac-
also Effects Associates, Inc. v. Larry Cohen, 817 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff, a film 
production company, sued defendant for copyright infringement. Id. at 73. The district 
court dismissed the claim for lack of a federal question. Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed, 
holding that the claim presented a federal question under the federal copyright laws. Id. 
at 74. The court, citing Louisville and N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152, stated that 
" . . . a claim arises under federal law for purposes of federal question jurisdiction on 
the basis of a well-pleaded complaint, not from anticipation of possible affirmative de-
fenses." Id. at 73. 
39. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). Plain-
tiffs filed a complaint, seeking a declaration that the Price-Anderson Act, which placed 
the liability limit of a nuclear power plant at 560 million dollars, was unconstitutional. 
Id. at 67. The Supreme Court found that the federal courts had jurisdiction to hear the 
case. Id. at 71. It also found that the Price-Anderson Act was constitutional. Id. at 84. 
Justice Rehnquist, writing in concurrence, observed: "This Court has held that the well-
pleaded complaint rule applied in Mottley is fully applicable in cases seeking only de-
claratory relief, because the Declaratory Judgment Act merely expands the re,medies 
available in the district courts without expanding their jurisdiciton." Id. at 98. 
40. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M KANE, AND A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.4 (1985). See also 
Trautman, Federal Right Jurisdiction and the Declaratory Remedy, 7 V AND. L. REV. 445 
(1954) (Examines the relationship between the Declaratory Judgment Act and federal 
question jurisdiction, and concludes that reforms are needed. Trautman reasons that de-
termination of federal issues should not be determined solely from the plaintiff's com-
plaint); Note, Developments in the Law - Declaratory Judgments, 62 HARV. L. REV. 787 
(1949) (Examines development of the declaratory judgment as a remedy; nature and 
functions of declaratory relief; availability of the remedy in conjunction with federal 
question and other bases of subject matter jurisdiction; surveys recent cases); Comment, 
Federal Question Jurisdiction and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 55 Ky L.J. 150 (1966) 
(Examines the nexus between federal question jurisdiction and the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act. Concludes there is a need for greater judicial clarification of the relationship 
between the Declaratory Judgment Act and federal question jurisdiction); Note, Federal 
Question Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 4 
V AND. L. REV. 827 (1951) (Focuses on the relationship between the Declaratory Judgment 
Act and federal question jurisdiction. Concludes that the rule forbidding the anticipa-
tion of a defense was not designed to cover the Declaratory Judgment Act). 
41. C. WRIGHT, A MILLER, AND M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2767 
(1984). 
42. 339 U.S. 667 (1950). In Skelly, an oil company filed a complaint for declaratory 
relief against three oil producers in an effort to enforce a contract between the oil com-
pany and the producers. Id. at 670-71. The Supreme Court held that an action under 
contract does not raise a federal question, and therefore dismissed the case for lack of 
federal jurisdiction. Id. at 678-79. The Court also stated that the Declaratory Judgment 
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tion that would have been necessary, absent the declaratory 
judgment procedure, could have been heard in federal court.43 
Thus, if a court would have had jurisdiction over an action 
brought by a plaintiff seeking a traditional form of relief, it 
would also have power to hear that plaintiff's declaratory relief 
action.44 Similarly, a declaratory relief action seeking to test a 
defense is triable in the federal courts provided this defense 
would normally arise in an answer to a complaint which itself 
would properly raise a federal question.45 In Clippers, the NBA 
was attempting to test its defense to the Clippers threatened an-
titrust action. The NBA wanted the Ninth Circuit to declare 
that the league would not be in violation of the antitrust laws if 
it sought sanctions against the Clippers.46 In this type of declar-
atory relief action, where the plaintiff seeks protection from con-
duct on behalf of the defendant which would possibly violate 
federal law, the positions of the parties are reversed; the issue 
then becomes whether the declaratory relief defendant could 
raise a federal question in a complaint.47 If yes, the dispute falls 
within the court's subject matter jurisdiction.48 
If it is assumed that the federal courts had jurisdiction to 
hear this case, it must be determined whether the grant of sum-
mary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 was 
43. Id. at 673-74. In Skelly, the Supreme Court held that the district court lacked 
jurisdiciton to entertain a federal declaratory claim seeking to establish what was in ef-
fect a reply to an anticipated federal defense. Id. With regard to Skelly, one commenta-
tor has observed: "In order to state a proper claim for declaratory relief under the [fed-
eral declaratory relief) statute, a complainant in a declaratory judgment action may 
assert rights that ordinarily would only be invoked as defenses or as replies to defenses 
in actions for traditional forms of relief." Waldman, Federal Jurisdiction over Declara-
tory Suits Challenging State Controversy, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 987 (1979). 
44. Skelly, 339 U.S. 667. 
45. Note, Developments in the law - Declaratory Judgments, 62 HARV. L. REV. 787, 
803 (1949). See supra note 40. 
46. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 563. 
47. Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 799 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 
1986). In Levin, the court stated: 
When a declaratory judgment plaintiff asserts a claim that is 
in the nature of a defense to a threatened or pending action, 
the character of the threatened or pendeing action determines 
whether federal jurisdiction exists with regard to the declara-
tory judgment action. If ... the declaratory judgment defend-
ant could have brought a coercive action in federal court to 
enforce its rights, jurisdiction exists for declaratory relief. 
Id. at 1315. (For the facts to this case, see infra note 93). 
48. Id. at 1315. 
8
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appropriate."g It is proper for a federal court to grant a motion 
for summary judgment only if there are no genuine issues of ma-
terial fact. ISO Antitrust actions, by their very nature, are poorly 
suited for disposition by summary judgment. IS! In antitrust 
cases, questions of motive or intent, credibility, and conspiracy 
frequently prevent summary judgment from being entered be-
cause these issues involve subjective questions regarding state of 
mind that can only be decided after a full trial.1S2 The Supreme 
Court has indicated that summary procedures should be used 
only sparingly in complex antitrust litigation.1S3 
IV. BACKGROUND 
In 1890, Congress approved the Sherman Act. M Comprised 
of several laws, ISIS the Act was designed to control the exercise of 
private economic power by preventing monopolies, punishing 
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
50. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1961). The ac-
tion was initiated in district court by Poller on behalf of an organization that once oper-
ated a local television station in Wisconsin. ld. at 467. Poller asserted that CBS violated 
the antitrust laws when it allegedly conspired with another local television station in an 
effort to monopolize the Milwaukee market. ld. The district court granted summary 
judgment to CBS, and the circuit court affirmed. ld. The Supreme Court, however, found 
that there were genuine issues of material fact and therefore reversed. ld. at 474. The 
Court stated that summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust 
litigation. ld. at 473. See also California Steel and Tube v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 650 F.2d 
1001 (9th Cir. 1981). California Steel and Tube brought an antitrust action alleging that 
Kaiser Steel's acquisition of a steel tubing division violated the Sherman Act. ld. In 
reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit stated "that 
summary judgment is to be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation in which mo-
tive and intent play leading roles." ld. at 1003, citing Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting 
System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1961). 
51. Paller, 368 U.S. at 473. 
52. ld. 
53. ld. at 473. 
54. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1983). 
55. ld. Section 1 is of primary importance here. It provides: 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be 
illegal •.. Every person who shall make any contract or engage 
in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal 
shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, 
shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a 
corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand 
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by 
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 
9
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cartels, and otherwise protecting competition.'16 It is the freedom 
of competition that ostensibly promotes general welfare in the 
economy.57 
The application of antitrust law to sports league restrictions 
on franchise movement is a recent development, and the Ninth 
Circuit has acknowledged that its application here is unusual. 58 
56. Standard Oil v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951). Standard Oil sold gasoline to "job-
bers" at 1.5 cents less per gallon than it did to retail gas stations. ld. at 235. ("Jobbers" 
were gas distributors who sold at both retail and wholesale prices. ld. at 235). The Su-
preme Court held that such activity did in fact have an adverse impact on competition, 
but was justified by Standard Oil's good faith belief that the price differential was neces-
sary to retain the "jobbers" as customers. ld. at 246. Justice Burton, writing for the 
Court, commented, "The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the 
value of competition." ld. at 248. See also Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 104 
F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Cal. 1952), a!f'd 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 
991 (1956), reh'g denied 351 U.S. 928 (1956). The United States District Court for the 
Central District of California held that the antitrust laws were not violated when an ice 
cream company cut prices, because there was no intent to destroy competition. ld. at 
807. Chief Judge Yankwich stated, "the object of the antitrust law is to encourage com-
petition." ld. 
57. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). In Northern Pacific 
Railway, the federal government brought suit to enjoin a railroad from the practice of 
"preferential routing." ld. at 3-4. Under this practice, the railroad would lease land on 
the condition that the lessee would ship all goods produced on the land via the railroad. 
ld. at 3. The government alleged that such routing imposed a restraint on trade, and was 
therefore in violation of the Sherman Act. ld. at 3-4. The Supreme Court agreed, and 
held that "preferential routing" was a violation of the antitrust laws. ld. at 12. 
58. NBA v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Antitrust 
laws have been applied to sports leagues in other contexts, such as player contracts and 
the draft. See North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 
(2nd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982) (Professional soccer league filed suit 
alleging a professional football league's ban on ownership by its members of teams in 
competing leagues violated the Sherman Act. Held: Sherman Act violated); Smith v. 
Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Player alleged that the NFL draft 
violated the Sherman Act because it limited a player's ability to compete economically. 
Held: Draft has an anticompetitive impact on players); Mackey v. National Football 
League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (Rule requiring a team which acquires a player in a 
trade to compensate the player's former team (The Rozelle Rule) was held to violate the 
Sherman Act); Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F.Supp 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), ap-
peal vacated, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979) (The "Ro-
zelle Rule," as well as the draft rule, among other league practices, were deemed to vio-
late the antitrust laws); Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(Player argued that league rule banning one-eyed hockey players for safety reasons was 
anticompetitive. Held: Antitrust laws not violated); Brenner v. World Boxing Council, 
675 F.2d 445 (2nd Cir. 1982) cert. denied 459 U.S. 835 (1982) (Boxing promoter was 
suspended by the World Boxing Council for violation of safety regulations. Held: No 
antitrust violation); Hayes v. National Football League, 469 F. Supp. 247. (C.D. Cal. 
1979) (Use of a "standard player contract" form when a player signed with an NFL team 
did not result in any restraint of trade. Held: No antitrust violation); United States 
Football League v. National Football League, 634 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (USFL 
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Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit held in Raiders I that the Na-
tional Football League had violated the antitrust laws when it 
attempted to prevent the Oakland Raiders from moving to Los 
Angeles.1I9 
The Raiders I court held that the rule of reason antitrust 
analysis, and not the per se analysis, applies to sports league cre-
ated restraints on franchise movement.60 The expression "per se 
violation" refers to those activities which are manifestly an-
ticompetitive, and therefore violate the antitrust laws.61 These 
per se violations include price fixing, bid rigging, market divi-
sion, and certain types of group boycotts.62 Under the per se 
analysis, the court 'need only identify the activity complained of, 
and determine if it fits within one of the proscribed categories.63 
If the activity does not constitute a per se violation, the court 
must conduct the more elaborate inquiry necessary under the 
rule of reason analysis.64 
When applying the rule of reason, the trier of fact examines 
all the surrounding circumstances to determine if the restraint 
tends to promote or suppress competition.611 If the restraint pro-
asserted that the existence of contracts between the NFL and the three major television 
networks violated the antitrust laws. Held: Antitrust laws not violated). 
Interestingly, baseball is exempt from antitrust scrutiny. The Supreme Court first 
considered the application of federal antitrust law to professional sports in Federal Base-
ball Clubs, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
The Court held that professional baseball is not involved in interstate commerce, and 
therefore is not subject to the Sherman Act. ld. at 209. The Court reached this conclu-
sion even though teams from different states competed against one another. ld. at 207. 
Baseball's unique exemption status persists to the present day. Annotation, Application 
of Federal Antitrust Laws to Professional Sports, 18 ALR FED 489, 504 (1974). 
59. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 
1381, 1398 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984) [hereinafter Raiders 1]. 
60. ld. at 1391. 
61. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). 
See infra note 106. . 
62. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, 22 (1984). 
63. Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 386-89 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 
U.S. 936 (1979). The owner of a furniture store brought an antitrust action against three 
condominium complexes alleging that they conspired to restrain trade by refusing to 
allow him to advertise in their paper. ld. at 383. The court held that there was no anti-
trust violation. ld. at 381. 
64. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 5 (1958). See supra note 57. 
65. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). The Chicago 
Board of Trade adopted what is known as the "Call" rule. ld. at 237. This rule provided 
that no trading shall take phice between the close of call and the opening of the trade 
session on the next business day. ld. Justice Brandeis found that the "Call" rule created 
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motes competition, it is reasonable.66 Conversely, if the restraint 
suppresses competition, it is unreasonable and in violation of the 
antitrust laws.67 In contrast to the per se approach, the mere 
existence of a restraint does not necessitate a finding of antitrust 
violations.68 
The Raiders I court, citing Kaplan v. Burroughs,69 held that 
the plaintiff, under the rule of reason analysis, must prove three 
elements to establish a prima facie antitrust case.70 The plaintiff 
must show: (1) there was an agreement between two or more 
persons; (2) the agreement was intended to restrict or restrain 
competition or trade; and (3) that competition or trade was in 
fact hindered by the agreement.71 
In Raiders I, the NFL asserted that it was not subject to the 
antitrust laws because it is a single entity.72 As such, it was inca-
pable of making an agreement with itself which was intended to 
keep the Raiders in Oakland. The Ninth Circuit held, however, 
that the NFL is not a single entity for antitrust purposes.73 
Rather, it is a league of twenty eight (28) teams - twenty two 
(22) of which voted to keep the Raiders in Oakland.74 The Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the NFL's restraint on trade and compe-
a restraint on trade. Id. at 239. In finding the restraint reasonable - and therefore not in 
violation of the antitrust laws - Justice Brandeis utilized the following test: "The true 
test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and thereby 
perhaps promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy 
competition." Id. at 238. See also Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: 
Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965) (An in-depth examination of 
the author's perspective on the appropriate role of the rule of reason and per se concept 
as applied to price fixing and market division). 
66. Chicago Bd., 246 U.S. at 238. 
67.Id. 
68.Id. 
69. 611 F.2d 286, 290 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 924 (1980). Kaplan was 
a trustee in bankruptcy for a data processing corporation. Id. at 267. He filed an anti-
trust action against Burroughs, a computer manufacturer, claiming that Burroughs had 
conspired with another data processing corporation to restrain trade. Id. at 288. Kaplan's 
suit was unsuccessful, however, because he failed to establish a relevant market in which 
the alleged restraint occurred. Id. at 296. 
70. In Clippers, the establishment of these three elements was left to the district 
court on remand. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 570. 
71. [d. at 567. 
72. Raiders [, 726 F.2d at 1387. The first element of Kaplan requires an agreement. 
[d. at 1391. A single entity cannot conspire to agree with itself. [d. at 1387. 
73. [d. at 1390. 
74. [d. at 1387-90. 
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tition was unreasonable, and therefore violated the antitrust 
laws.'5 
In 1986, the Ninth Circuit rendered its decision in Raiders 
II.'s In this action, the court held that the Raiders recovery from 
the NFL for violation of the antitrust laws must be off-set 
against the amount the NFL lost when the Raiders seized the 
Los Angeles area franchise opportunity." Thus, through Raiders 
I and Raiders II, the Ninth Circuit developed an analytical 
framework for application of the antitrust laws in the area of 
sports league relocation rules. Utilizing this framework, the 
Ninth Circuit again considered the application of antitrust law 
to sports league created restrictions on franchise movement in 
the Clippers case.'8 
V. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. PROCEDURE 
In NBA v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc.,'9 both the Los Ange-
les Memorial Coliseum and the San Diego Clippers argued that 
there was no "actual controversy" which would allow federal 
jurisdiction over the NBA's request for declaratory judgment.8o 
They claimed that since the NBA had taken no affirmative ac-
tion to sanction the Clippers or deny them scheduling rights in 
Los Angeles, the issues of the case were not sufficiently refined 
to allow federal jurisdiction.81 The defendants asserted that it 
was unlikely that the NBA would be willing to sanction the Clip-
75. Id. at 1401. Actually, the court affirmed the district court's judgment upholding 
the jury's verdict. Id. at 1398. It must be presumed, therefore, that all three Kaplan 
elements were proven to the satisfaction of the jury. 
76. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 791 F.2d 
1356 (9th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Raiders 11]. 
77. Id. at 1373. 
78. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 563. 
79. National Basketball Ass'n v. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d 562, (9th Cir. 1987). 
80. Id. at 565. The Clippers and the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum were co-de-
fendants in this action. Id. 
81. Id. The defense asserted that the reasoning of Hendrix v. Poonai, 662 F.2d 719 
(11th Cir. 1981), was applicable here. In Hendrix, a hospital sought a declaration that its 
refusal to hire a doctor would not violate the antitrust laws. Id. at 720. Since the hospi-
tal had not yet refused to hire the doctor, there was no actual controversy. Id. at 722. 
The Eleventh Circuit held that no jurisdiction existed over such an abstract question 
"based upon the possibility of a factual situation that may never develop." Id. 
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pers.82 To resolve the actual controversy issue, the court used 
the test provided in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal and 
Oil CO.83 There, the Supreme Court stated that declaratory judg-
ments are justiciable if "there is a substantial controversy, be-
tween parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient imme-
diacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory 
judgment. "84 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that 
the claim for declaratory relief was based on a hypothetical set 
of facts.85 Rather, the court determined that the NBA's claim for 
declaratory relief was not overly speculative.88 It found the 
NBA's complaint for declaratory relief to seek a determination 
which would, in essence, permit the league to evaluate and as-
sess limits on franchise movement without violating the anti-
trust laws.87 As further evidence of an actual controversy, the 
court stated that the defendants have been in direct conflict 
with the NBA on many issues.88 The court, citing Societe de 
Conditionnement en Aluminium v. Hunter Eng'g CO.,89 held 
that the claim for declaratory relief was justiciable due to the 
NBA's "real and reasonable apprehension" that any action on 
the Clippers move could result in antitrust liability.9o 
The Coliseum further attacked by asserting that the court 
had no federal question jurisdiction.91 The Coliseum argued that 
the antitrust issues were in fact contract issues, and therefore 
82. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 566. 
83. 312 U.S. 270, (1941). See supra notes 30-34. 
84. Maryland Casualty, 312 U.S. at 23. See supra notes 30-34. 
85. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 565-66. 
86.Id. 
87.Id. 
88. Id. at 568. There were several genuine issues of fact: 1) The purpose of the re-
straint as demonstrated by the NBA's use of a variety of criteria in evaluating franchise 
movement; 2) the market created by professional basketball, which the NBA alleged is 
substantially different from that of professional football; 3) the actual effect the NBA's 
limitations on movements might have on trade; and 4) whether the mere requirement 
that a team seek NBA Board of Governor approval before it seizes a new franchise loca-
tion violates the Sherman Act. Id. 
89. 655 F.2d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1981). In Societe, plaintiff brought an action seeking 
a declaratorY judgment that a patent owned by the defendant was invalid. Id. at 940. 
The court held that there is a "case or controversy" if the plaintiff has a real and reason-
able apprehension of liability. Id. at 944. 
90. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 566. 
91. Id. 
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should have been resolved in state court.92 The court was not 
persuaded by this argument.93 Citing Levin Metals Corp. v. 
Parr-Richmond Terminal Corp.,94 the court said, "If ... the de-
claratory judgment defendant could have brought a coercive ac-
tion in federal court to enforce its rights, jurisdiction exists for 
declaratory relief."95 Since the Clippers and the Coliseum had 
threatened the NBA with antitrust litigation for any interfer-
ence with the move, the NBA could seek declaratory relief from 
that liability.96 The court further held that the existence of a 
state contract defense did not defeat federal jurisdiction over 
the antitrust dispute.97 
The court also held that the grant of summary judgment 
was inappropriate in this case.98 Granting a motion for summary 
judgment is appropriate only if there are no genuine issues of 
material fact.99 In this case, there were several antitrust issues in 
dispute which could be resolved only by a trier of fact.loo Sum-
mary judgment is disfavored in heavily factual settings such as 
complex antitrust cases that involve issues of motive and in-
tent.IOI While the proper case may warrant summary judgment, 
the court held that in this case there remain genuine issues of 
material fact, and that summary judgment should not have been 
granted.lo2 
B. ANTITRUST 
The Ninth Circuit's analysis of the antitrust issues was con-
92. [d. The contractual relationship is a joint venture under the laws of New York 
State. [d. at 564. 
93. [d. at 566. 
94. 799 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1986). Parr-Richmond sold some contaminated land to 
Levin Metals. [d. at 1314. Levin Metals threatened to sue under the federal Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act [hereinafter CERCLA]. 
[d. A suit by Levin Metals would be within the court's federal question jurisdiction. [d. 
at 1315. Therefore, the court held, a counterclaim by Parr-Richmond seeking declara-
tory relief under CERCLA would also fall within the court's jurisdiction. [d. 
95. [d. at 1315. 
96. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 566. 
97. [d. 
98. [d. at 566-67. 
99. [d. On review, the court will view the facts in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. [d. at 567. 
100. See supra note 87. 
101. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 567. See supra notes 49-53. 
102. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 567. See supra note 87. 
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sistent with the precedent established in Raiders 1 and Raiders 
11.103 The court asserted that the resolution of the Clipper's case 
would be controlled by those opinions.l04 It rejected the defend-
ants' contention that a restriction on franchise movement in and 
of itself violates the antitrust laws.l05 
Pursuant to Raiders 1, the court held that the antitrust 
analysis of a sports league's franchise relocation rule is governed 
by the rule of reason. lOG To be successful, the antitrust plaintiff 
must establish that the pro competitive attributes of a restraint 
are outweighed by its anticompetive attributes.l07 If such is the 
case, the restraint will be deemed unreasonable. lOB 
The Clippers court - again following the lead of the Raid-
ers court - asserted that the antitrust plaintiff must meet the 
three elements of Kaplan. l09 The Raiders court had carefully ex-
amined the structure of professional football using the Kaplan 
standard.llo It concluded that the relevant market for profes-
sional football, the history and purpose of the franchise move-
ment rule, and the lack of justification for the rule under the 
ancillary restraint doctrine supported the jury's verdict.l11 In so 
103. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 567-69. 
104. ld. at 567. 
105. ld. 
106. ld. See supra notes 60-68. 
107. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 
(1978). This antitrust action was brought by the United States to nullify an association's 
cannon of ethics prohibiting bidding by its member engineers. ld. at 681. The key in-
quiry is whether the restraint will promote competiton, or suppress it. ld. at 690. If the 
restraint tends to regulate and thereby enhance competition, it will be deemed reason-
able. ld. at 691. If the restraint tends to suppress and thereby diminish competition, it 
will be deemed unreasonable. ld. 
108. ld. at 691. 
109. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 567. See supra notes 69-71, and accompanying text. 
110. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 567. 
111. ld. Analysis of violations under section I of the Sherman Act requires inquiry 
into several complex matters. There must be proof of a contract, combination, or con-
spiracy; proof that the restraint is unreasonable; and proof that the restraint affects in-
terstate commerce. ld. See supra note 28, and accompanying text. The most difficult of 
these inquiries is whether the restraint is reasonable. The court must decide whether the 
case should be analyzed under the per se approach, or under the rule of reason. The 
Raiders cases were analyzed under the rule of reason. See supra notes 60-71, and accom-
panying text. Therefore the court had to determine whether there was a restraint, and if 
there was, whether it was reasonable. See supra notes 60-71, and accompanying text. 
In the Clippers case, the Ninth Circuit merely determined that the rule of reason 
should be applied to the dispute. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 568. The actual analysis under 
the rule of reason, however, was to be conducted by the district court on remand. ld. at 
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doing, the Raiders I court did not establish an absolute rule for 
sports leagues.ll2 Rather, it examined the facts before it and 
concluded that the NFL violated the antitrust laws. us 
Since the district court did not apply the rule of reason 
analysis, the Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment, and 
remanded the case for trial in accordance with the dictates of 
Raiders I and Raiders II. U4 
VI. CRITIQUE 
A. PROCEDURE 
To bring a declaratory relief action in federal court, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of an actual contro-
versy and argue that the case raises a federal question.1l5 
The U.S. Constitutionu6 and the Declaratory Judgment 
Actll7 require that the parties have an actual controversy before 
the federal courts will have jurisdiction. us When the Clippers 
moved to Los Angeles in 1984, the League did not have a restric-
tion against team moves.ll9 The NBA adopted Article 9A and 
brought suit against the Clippers after the team had relocated.120 
The League had previously adopted no restrictions which could 
have prevented the Clippers move, nor hindered the franchise's 
ability to compete.121 The Clippers argued that the team had no 
reason to file an antitrust action, and therefore the NBA's com-
plaint for declaratory relief must fail for lack of an actual con-
troversy.122 An understanding of the sequence of events is very 
570. See supra notes 102-13, and accompanying text. 
112. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 567. 
113. [d. 
114. [d. at 570. 
115. See supra notes 28-48, and accompanying text. 
116. U.S. Const. art. III § 2, cl. 1. See supra note 28. 
117. Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982). See supra note 28. 
118. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal and Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941). 
The parties must have adverse legal interests. [d. See supra notes 28-48, and accompa-
nying text. 
119. National Basketball Ass'n v. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
120. [d. 
121. [d. The League's constitution required the Clippers to secure permission from 
the Los Angeles Lakers. [d. The Clippers complied with this provision. [d. 
122. [d. at 565. Arguably the Clippers' move violated the team's obligations under 
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important to this argument. When the Clippers moved to Los 
Angeles, the league arguably had no mechanism to restrict 
them.12s The NBA sought a declaratory judgment stating that 
the league would not be in violation of the antitrust laws if they 
attempted to sanction the Clippers.124 But the Clippers were al-
ready in Los Angeles, and therefore had no reason to file an 
antitrust action against the NBA. They had moved prior to the 
adoption of Article 9A and therefore, arguably, there was no ac-
tual controversy.12t5 The NBA countered that Article 9A was 
merely a codification of previous practice and therefore enforce-
able against the Clippers.128 The court, recognizing that the 
Clippers had threatened the NBA with an antitrust suit for any 
efforts to prevent the move - including attempts to sanction 
the team after the move - appropriately determined that there 
was an actual controversy.127 
In addition to an actual controversy, the complaint raised a 
federal question.128 When seeking a traditional form of relief, the 
well-pleaded complaint rule requires that the complaint raise a 
federal question, rather than assert what the defendant might 
raise as a defense.129 Were this a traditional action, the court 
would not have had jurisdiction because the antitrust issue 
would arise only as a defense to the NBA's efforts to sanction 
the Clippers.13O A declaratory judgment action, however, may be 
entertained in federal court if, in addition to an actual contro-
versy, the subject matter of the suit falls within the court's juris-
diction.lsl In this case, an actual controversy existed involving 
the Sherman Act, presenting a federal question which gave the 
court subject matter jurisdiction. If this were a traditional ac-
tion, it could have been brought by the Clippers, but not the 
the joint venture laws of the State of New York. Though this contract issue could be 
resolved in state court, it does not negate the federal court's antitrust jurisdiction. [d. at 
566. 
123. [d. at 564. 
124. [d. 
125. [d. 
126. [d. See supra note 18. 
127. Clippers, F.2d at 568. 
128. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 772 (1950). See supra 
notes 42-44, and accompanying text. 
129. [d. 
130. See supra notes 28-48, and accompanying text. In a traditional action, the 
NBA could not have brought an antitrust action against the Clippers in federal court. [d. 
131. [d. 
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NBA. The Declaratory Judgment Act, however, permits the 
NBA to raise the antitrust question on the face of its 
complaint.132 
Since the case presented an actual controversy involving an 
issue within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, 
it is apparent that the court had the power to hear this case. 
B. ANTITRUST 
The Ninth Circuit's opinion carefully follows the dictates of 
Raiders I and Raiders II, and appears to be an appropriate ap-
plication of antitrust law. The Raiders I court found that the 
NFL was not immune from the antitrust laws as a single busi-
ness entity.133 Moreover, the Raiders I court held that the rule 
of reason analysis governs a professional sports league's efforts 
to restrict franchise movement.134 Consistently, the Clippers 
court determined that the rule of reason analysis applies to the 
NBA's attempt to control franchise moves,135 and that whether 
the NBA is a single entity for purposes of antitrust analysis re-
mains a question of fact.13s 
Raiders I did not hold that league created restrictions on 
franchise movement constitute per se violations of the antitrust 
laws.137 More narrowly, the Raiders I court found that a jury, 
applying the rule of reason standard, could reasonably have 
found that the NFL violated antitrust laws in restraining the 
Raiders from moving to Los Angeles.13s 
Whether the NBA restrained the Clippers from moving to 
Los Angeles or not is a difficult question of fact.139 The Clippers 
asserted that they were in Los Angeles before the NBA created 
rules regarding franchise moves.140 As such, the NBA could not 
132. [d. 
133. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 
1381, 1390 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984) [hereinafter Raiders I]. 
134. [d. at 1390-92. See supra notes 58-71, and accompanying text. 
135. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 567-68. 
136. [d. 
137. [d. at 567. 
138. [d. 
139. [d. 
140. [d. at 564. 
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have restrained the move.l41 Conversely, the NBA argued that 
Article 9A of the NBA Constitution essentially codified past 
practice within the NBA, and prohibited the Clippers from mov-
ing.142 Thus, it is unclear whether the Clippers were restricted 
from moving, much less whether there were any unreasonable 
restraints on trade. These are questions of fact which will be an-
swered by a jury on remand. 
The district court's assertion that the NBA "could not pos-
sibly win this case" is without foundation.143 Even if the Clip-
pers do in fact establish that restrictions on trade or competition 
were created by the NBA Constitution, the NBA need only es-
tablish that those restrictions were reasonable.144 The mere exis-
tence of a restraint on trade does not constitute an antitrust vio-
lation.145 Recognizing this, the Ninth Circuit appropriately 
reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for 
trial.146 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit is the leading authority on the applica-
tion of antitrust law to sports league created restraints on 
franchise movement. Though the results of the Raiders and 
Clippers' cases may ultimately be different, the underlying 
framework of analysis has been applied consistently in each 
opinion. In the Raiders I and Raiders II opinions, the court es-
tablished the method for antitrust analysis in this area. The 
Clippers opinion reasserted and confirmed the soundness of the 
court's antitrust approach. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit has 
recognized that the activities of the NFL and the NBA are 
within the flow of interstate commerce. As such, they are sub-
ject to the dictates of the federal antitrust laws. An attempt by a 
league to restrict teams from relocating is not a per se violation 
of the Sherman Act. Rather, the court will apply the rule of rea-
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 565. 
144. Id. at 567. To establish reasonableness, the NBA need only show that the 
procompetitive effects of the restraint outweigh its anticompetitive effects. See supra 
text note 65, and accompanying text. 
145. See supra text accompanying note 65. 
146. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 570. 
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son analysis to determine, on a case by case basis, if the restric-
tion constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws. This approach 
is more beneficial than the per se approach because it recognizes 
the team's legitimate interest in moving to a market where 
greater profits may be realized, as well as the league's legitimate 
interest in restricting franchise moves to enhance the league's 
economic stability. Though it is certain that antitrust law was 
not created with this situation in mind, the analysis used by this 
court makes its application here seem clearly appropriate. 
Ronald J. Shingler* 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989. 
21
Shingler: Antitrust Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1988
